In Slovenia, even twenty years after the adoption of its Constitution, the amendments to the constitutional arrangements for the appointment of ministers represent one of the fundamental constitutional dilemmas of the political elite and experts on constitutional law. The following two variants German constitution, ministers would be appointed by the president of the republic on the proposal of the president of the government, elected by the National Assembly; according to the second variant, the National Assembly would elect the president of the government together with the submitted candidate list of ministers. Nevertheless, the appointment of ministers according to the chancellorship model, which excludes the parliament from any voting on their appointment, i.e. also from the vote of investiture on the government, would undermine their legitimacy and disproportionally strengthen the constitutional position of the president of the government. In contrast, the election of the president of the government together with legitimate. However, it will not be possible to form a stable government without changing the electoral system, which systemically causes party fragmentation of the National Assembly.
Suspension of the appointment of Ministers in the National
Assembly as a deviation from the parliamentary system
In Slovenia, even twenty years after the adoption of its Constitution,
Fundamental Dilemmas Concerning the Constitutional Arrangements for the Formation of the Government in the Republic of Slovenia
As can be seen from its various basic models as well as from its lengthy discussions, the Constitutional Commission itself already had certain reservations on the adopted constitutional arrangements for the formation of federal government. Prominent constitutional legal experts, who otherwise emphasize the historic and political context in which the constitution was adopted, also consider that the constitutional arrangements for the appointment of federal ministers are not compatible with the fundamental principles of the parliamentary system. Roman Herzog, for instance, in one of his prominent commentaries on the German constitution, considers the appointment of federal ministers on the proposal of the federal president without any participation of the Bundestag as a »breach« (Durchbrechung) Durchbrechung Durchbrechung of fundamental principles of parliamentarism (Herzog, 1993 , Article 62, MN 76). Fritz Münch (1954 ) even considers such a procedure of appointing Federal Ministers to be an »aversion« (Abwendung) of the Abwendung Abwendung parliamentary system. Even in the Slovenian professional literature we can read a critical observation that »the German chancellor essentially forms the government himself, while the Bundestag does not participate with any kind of voting, it only elects the chancellor himself, even without the government for that matter« (Krivic, 2002, p. 281 ).
In the explanation of its proposal, the Slovenian Government refers to the »chancellorship« arrangements for the appointment of federal ministers, which was, however (as already pointed out) adopted in the social and political context in the post-war Germany as a pragmatic compromise. In doing so, it underestimates the principle of sovereignty of the people, according to which the parliament in the parliamentary system is the source of the democratic legitimacy of the government, while at the same time it overestimates the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the constitutional arrangements of government formation in the classic parliamentary system and the German parliamentary government system, as it is consistently designated in German literature, lies in the fact that classic governments are based on vote of investiture, while the German federal government is based only on the investiture vote on the federal chancellor (Hermes, 1998 (Hermes, , p. 1188 . The potential suspension of the appointment of ministers in the National Assembly would thus limit the democratic legitimacy of the government and at the same time recognize the »chancellor position« of the president of the government in its formation.
Given that the Slovenian parliamentary system does not use the instrument of investiture vote and that the government's proposal does not foresee any other form of vote in the National Assembly on support to the ministers, the suspension of vote on the appointment of ministers in the National Assembly would be a deviation from the parliamentary system. According to this proposal, the second paragraph of Article 111 would be amended so as to read: »The president of the government together with the submitted candidate list of ministers is elected by the National Assembly by a majority vote of all deputies unless otherwise provided by this constitution.« Voting would be public. The National Assembly would vote on the election of the president of the government together with the candidate list of ministers, also in the potential second and third rounds, while following unsuccessful second or third vote the president of the republic would dissolve the National Assembly and call new elections.
While the professional public welcomed the proposal, considering it a search for constitutional possibilities for a more rational formation of the government, part of the public was explicitly critical towards the central part of the proposal according to which the National Assembly would vote on the election of the president of the government together with the candidate list of ministers. In a particularly critical opinion, it was stated that the proposal, in line with which the National Assembly would vote on the formation of the government »at one time«, is both in principle and in practice incompatible with the formation of the government in the parliamentary system, in which votes on the government's investiture vote (cf. Krivic, 2001, pp. 85-86) .
Compared to traditional procedures of the formation of parliamentary governments, the proposal was indeed surprising, but simultaneous voting on the formation of government as a whole had already been introduced in some newer constitutions, including those of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. Thus, the Serbian constitution states: »The National Assembly shall simultaneously vote on the government's programme and election of the prime minister and members of the government« (Article 127, third paragraph). The constitution of Montenegro includes a substantively 3 Government formation and functioning, and the electoral system
